

ARAB FAMILIES WORKING GROUP
AFWG and the Research-Policy Nexus: Capacity Strengthening and Peer Learning

July 17 and 18, 2010 BARCELONA

Vila Universitaria classroom “Aula 2” at the Vila Universitària students Hall of Residence

July 17, 2010

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|-------------|---|
| 9:00 am | Welcome: Suad Joseph, Barbara Ibrahim and Rawwida Baksh, IDRC |
| 9:15-10 | Introduction to AFWG history, projects, and policy concerns
Suad Joseph and Barbara Ibrahim |
| 10 – 12 | Policy and Research: Distinct Discourses, Intersecting Aims
<i>What are the contemporary policy processes in our research settings?</i>
<i>How can research remain both independent and policy-effective?</i>
Lina Abou-Habib CRTD, Simel Esim ILO |
| 12:00 -1 pm | Lunch |
| 1:00 -3:00 | Research-to-Policy Case Study: Lebanon. Lina Abou Habib CRTD |
| 3:00 | Break |
| 3:30-5:30 | Research-to- Policy Case Study: Palestine: Simel Esim ILO |
| 7:00 -9:30 | Dinner together in Barcelona |

July 18, 2010

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 9-10:30am | Research-to-Policy: An AFWG Case Study in Palestine: Islah Jad |
| 10:30-11:00 | Break |
| 11- 12:30 | Lessons learned from the 3 cases for AFWG Research-to-Policy Work
<i>What are some potentially important policy questions and approaches for current or future AFWG research?</i>
Rawwida Baksh IDRC and Jennifer Klot, SSRC |
| 12:30pm | Lunch |
| 1:30 – 3:30 | Group Exercise: Writing a Policy Brief on One Key Issue
Lina Abou-Habib & Simel Esim |
| 3:30 | Break |
| 4:00 -5:30 | Bellagio Meeting in March 2011: Planning Future Research
Wrapping up: Suad Joseph & Barbara Ibrahim |
| 7:00 -9:30 | Dinner together @ |

PLEASE READ CASES IN ADVANCE. NAMES ON THE PROGRAM ARE FACILITATORS FOR COLLECTIVE AND COLLABORATIVE DISCUSSIONS

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Background note from ODI about policy briefs as a communication tool for development research.

[..\Background note from ODI about policy briefs as a communication tool for development research.pdf](#)

Research-to-Policy Case Study: Lebanon. Lina Abou Habib CRTD

[..Lebanon case 1 research and policy influence july 2010.pdf](#)

Research-to- Policy Case Study: Palestine. Simel Esim ILO

1- Palestine English Final: Regional Initiative on Gender Equality and Workers' Rights in the Informal Economies of Arab States

Unprotected Employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Gender Equality and Workers' Rights Perspective

Jamil Hilal, Saleh Al Kafri, and Eileen Kuttab

[..\Palestine English Final 2008.pdf](#)

2- Policy Brief Palestine informal final. Policy Brief 2: Protecting workers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[..\policy brief palestine informal final.pdf](#)

Youth and Institutional Support in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Examining the conditions and the aspirations of the youth in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is essential, not only as the youth represent approximately one third of the population of the OPT, 32% at the end of 2000. But also because the youth are the social group most heavily affected by the current changes impacting Palestinian society, whether of a positive or negative nature (PCBS, 2001: 13).

This section of the study focuses on the role of institutions in mediating the effects of violence in general, and considers in particular the institutional support provided for the youth in particular areas suffering from prolonged duration of public violence by the Israeli army and settlers. In what follows we suggest that while disaggregating data by regions is important in order to understand the gaps that may exist between urban, rural and refugee camps – as it is the case in the data provided by PCBS and others. However, it is also necessary to conduct an internal aggregation in each region, whether within urban centres, rural areas or the camps. **Moreover, in the context of ongoing Israeli violence we recommend that the regions be aggregated and analysed according to the level of the intensity and duration of public violence inflicted on each area.** Areas facing prolonged exposure to violence exhibited a tendency to internalise violence and reproduce it locally; this has a differential impact on local communities within each locality and impacts them in very particular ways. As shall be suggested below, the effects of military violence is aggravated when there is a lack of integrated development approach and institutional support for the community to draw on.

In regard to levels and forms of institutional support, in what follows we critically examine the 'targeting politics' of organisations. Many governmental and non-governmental institutions follow a policy of 'targeting' the poor, the youth and the marginalised. We suggest that it is crucial not to 'fix' the 'targeted' groups; rather targeting policy should follow the ever changing political situation on the ground and the address situated forms of support that social groups such as the youth require in these circumstances.

Putting Youth into the Context in the OPT

Who are the 'Youth'?

According to the UN the youth are defined as individuals between the ages of 15-24.

The Palestinian context there is a definitional confusion in regard to 'who are the youth'. This needs to be addressed: one standard definition is needed in order to enable the collection of accurate and comparable data capturing the specific features of the youth.

According to the UN the youth are defined as those between the ages of 15-24. In the Palestinian context, however, the definition of 'youth' varies according to the different Palestinian policy documents, research papers or statistics produced by the PCBS and other institutions. In the PCBS statistics, for example, there is no consistency on who is considered a youth. In the PCBS report entitled "Palestinian Youth: Facts and Figures" youth were defined as "individuals aged (10-24) years, this age group includes: children aged (10-14) years, adolescents aged (15-19) years, and adults aged (20-24) years" (PCBS, 2001: 13). In another report produced by the same institutions, the data on youth was aggregated into two age groups 10-17 and 19-24 (PCBS, 2000).

Similarly, the Ministry of Youth and Sports uses yet another conflicting definition of the youth. The Ministry aggregates the youth and relates to them according to three age groups: children from 7-12, addressed through the childhood directorate in the Ministry. Adolescents from the age of 13-17, targeted by the adolescent directorate, and finally the youth ages 17-35, addressed through the youth affairs directorate. Thus the ministries and institutions in the West Bank and Gaza espouse different ways of defining and aggregating the youth within the policies and institutional practices.¹ **This confusion in terms of 'who of the youth' in the OPT needs to be addressed: one standard definition is needed in order to enable the collection of accurate and comparable data capturing the specific features of each age group.**

Youth and their Institutions: Voices from the Focus Groups

In Naeleen, the international solidarity movements as well as the existing local institutions and committees helped the village of Naeleen to achieve a higher level of internal social solidarity, as well as lower levels of internal violence, higher levels of female mobility, education and greater openness toward women's participation in the labor force and in public life.

In the old city of Hebron without such institutions the focus groups revealed a dangerous level of community disintegration and internalisation, by the community at large and the youth in particular, of the public daily violence exercised by the Israeli army and settlers.

Statistical data reveals that are many gaps which disadvantage and marginalise rural areas whether at the level of job opportunity, access to resources and control of these resources. Yet, the focus groups discussions also revealed that an **equally important dimension resides in the existence and/or the lack thereof of supportive institutions that take into consideration the evolving needs of communities affected by the Wall or the systematic Israeli public violence.**

A case in point, which came up through our qualitative research, is Naeleen and the old city in Hebron. In both localities the intensity and duration of public violence by the Israel army was almost equal. Yet **in Naeleen, the international solidarity movements as well as the existing local supportive institutions and local committees helped the village of Naeleen to achieve a**

¹ In 2005, the Ministry of Youth and sports produced, in collaboration with the Development Study Centre in Bir Zeit University, The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth, in which youth was defined by the age group 15-24. It was suggested to complement this document by another one to cover later on the age group between 25-35.

higher level of internal social solidarity, combating the effects of violence. As well these mediating structures helped the village to achieve lower levels of internal violence, higher levels of female mobility, education and greater openness toward women's participation in the labor force and in public life. **In contrast, voices from the focus group in the old city of Hebron indicated a dangerous level of community disintegration and internalisation, by the community at large and the youth in particular, of the public daily violence exercised by the Israeli army and settlers.** This situation is aggravated by the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and the collapse as well as the inefficiency of the local security system provided by the Palestinian Authority. The impact on women was increased conservatism.

Naeleen and the Old City of Hebron: The Role of Intuitions in Mediating Violence

In Naeleen, community organisations created channels for social and political participation: this strengthened the spirit of activism and voluntarism and enabled modes of collective solidarity that combated the effects of Israeli violence.

In the old city of Hebron, in the absence of comparable community structures, a strong sense of 'integrated fear', insecurity, scepticism and isolation prevailed.

In the village of Naeleen there are two centres serving the youth; one is a sports club and the other a community centre. The impact of the two institutions is significant for both genders.

A young man from Naeleen indicated:

I spend most of my time after I finish my work in the community centre (Al-Hadaf) through which we do lots of activities for our village.

The same sense of self esteem and belonging was expressed by a young woman who said:

I spend most of my time doing embroidery but I am also a volunteer for Al-Hadaf centre, we give supportive teaching to students in the elementary level, we teach around 85 children after school.

The focus groups revealed that **there is a high level of activism and voluntarism among the youth and other social groups in village public life in Naeleen.** The role of the international solidarity groups who regularly support the village resisting the Separation Wall and the violence of the Israeli army and settlers was an important factor in breaking the isolation and the marginalisation of the village. This in turn strengthened the creation of an enabling environment for activism, civic engagement collective modes of support.

The spirit of voluntarism and activism was also conveyed by those interviewed in Gaza. One 24 years old woman from Gaza city said:

Without my volunteering with Sharek (the biggest youth association in Gaza), I wouldn't have been able to find a good job. I have been applying for jobs since my second year in the

university. All the training courses I attained and the voluntary work I have done gave me eventually the opportunity to get a job. I am working now as a project coordinator for 6 months and it is renewable. I get a salary of \$700 a month. I pay the whole salary for my parents except \$100 for my personal expenses and my transport (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

In contrast to this, **in the old city of Hebron, in the absence of comparable community structures, a strong sense of 'integrated fear'², insecurity, scepticism and isolation prevailed.** Participants in the focus groups mentioned the collapse of the value system that used to govern the relationship between students and teachers, between neighbours and between the population at large and the local Palestinian security system.

In one of the focus groups in Hebron with school teachers, some of the participants expressed a deep sense of despair and bitterness:

Students in the old city are a special case different from the rest of students in Hebron. Here in the old city we start our classes at 9 and not at 8 as the rest of the schools in Hebron, and this is because of the delays at the checkpoints, even though we have permits passes. Students here live in economic hardship, some of them are armed and they use their arms for the slightest problem; also parents do not care about their children....families have lots of conflict and they too use arms because they don't fear the local police.

Checkpoints, prolonged Israeli violence and daily harassments have created a deeper sense of humiliation and fear as one teacher indicated:

Checkpoints are served sometimes to recruit collaborators from students and teachers, they give us letters to meet with the 'intelligence service – mokhabarat' to pressure us to work with them in exchange for leaving us alone, to cross the checkpoints in peace, without humiliation, if we accept to cooperate, this happened to me.

Another voice complained from the collapse of the local police institutions:

There is the fear of the growing thefts, harassment, rape, collaboration with the Israelis and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to safeguard security and safety for the citizens, particularly in the city of Hebron, I don't know about other places. But when you go to the police to report about series of thefts in the same neighbourhood and on daily basis they don't move. Now not only are houses being robbed but also mosques and the government does nothing. Now we have formed a youth committee to watch our houses by night.

A sense of helplessness and isolation was also expressed:

Today, I fear for myself as a teacher from my students and their families, you don't know how to deal with cases of thefts, drugs and sexual assaults.....you fear also to be killed on the

² This term is used to denote a multi-faceted fear from the Israeli violence, among students, their families, and the armed groups. Here the public violence is internalised and replicates itself in other local individuals or groups.

checkpoints or maimed... soldiers humiliate us intentionally in front of our students and our students mock us because we cannot say a word or defend ourselves as teachers.

The focus group discussions in the old city of Hebron also **revealed the rise of other social problems, ranging from a high school drop out rate, to early marriage for girls and for labor market entry for boys, smoking and thefts in the schools and restrictions on women's movements.** This reality reflected itself in some of the recent statistics which show that the drop out rate for urban girls in southern West Bank was much higher than in the north or the centre of the West Bank. Drop out rates in northern West Bank for urban females, 18 years and over, was 40.2%, as compared with 35.7% in the centre of the West Bank, 46.4% in the southern West Bank and 35.8% in Gaza (PCBS 2006, unpublished data). This could be explained by the prevalence of poverty and early marriage in the Southern West Bank.

The weak presence of supportive institutions in the old city has exacerbated cynicism, lack of trust and reinforced the breakdown of social bonds. **More worryingly there are signs that forms of social control are being introduced that further reinforce social disaggregation, when what is really needed, as this participant explained, is community mechanisms of solidarity and support:**

People here (in old city Hebron) got used to receive aids, youth are not active enough but this is because they don't have sports clubs, parks or other means to help them vent the daily violence they face. Some schools use now surveillance cameras to watch the students, but this is not enough, they need more institutions to support their needs.

Youth and their Institutions: the Statistical Data

While the use of cultural and sports institutions by the youth are minimal, the low level of participation may reflect an unavailability of institutions as opposed to a lack of interest on the part of the youth, as the focus groups revealed.

A number of important findings emerge from the data available on institutions that provide services for the youth. Firstly, while the use of cultural and sports institutions by the youth are minimal, the low level of participation may reflect an unavailability of institutions as opposed to a lack of interest on the part of the youth, as the focus groups revealed.

Statistical data showed that 7.5% of the individuals aged (10-24) years are members of sport clubs, 3.0% are members of cultural clubs, and 5.8% are members of public libraries. For individuals (aged 10 years and over) the results showed that 6.0% of them were members of sport clubs, 3.0% were members of cultural clubs and 3.6% were members of public libraries. Yet, the data on how youth use their time also revealed a very high interest in sporting activities and the arts, suggesting that youth are interested in these activities, but that there are likely insufficient institutions. The Time Use Survey conducted by the PCBS during May, 1999 - May, 2000 showed that among youth aged 10-24, 33.5% played sports, 24.7% practiced drawing and 19.6% attended public symposiums and public lectures, among other activities. Among individuals aged

10 and over 20.0% attended public symposiums and lectures, 19.3% played sports and 13.5% participated in drawing, among other activities.

It is also interesting to note that although the number of youth institutions in Gaza is less than in the West Bank, the frequency of using these places by males and females is higher for Gaza than in the West Bank. This confirms the high level of interest among the youth in such activities, there is a very limited number of youth institutions in Gaza, yet the intensity of use them is much higher than in the West Bank.

The data also showed that there is a wide gap between the percentages of male and female membership in cultural institutions: female membership in cultural institutions is much lower than males. At the same time, the data below showed interesting results in that females are more interested in cultural activities than males, while more males participated in sports activities. This is likely due to the relative ease of male mobility compared to females: women face a disadvantage in accessing sporting institutions or in sharing in activities that necessitate flexible mobility.

Youth, Gender and Leisure Time

The statistical data on youth shows a persistent wide gap in the time males and females spend on a first job or on their occupation in general. Only 5.2 % of women use their time for a job, as compared to 43.8% of men.

Overall female participation in cultural and sports activities is higher in Gaza than the West Bank.

The statistical data on youth shows a persistent wide gap in the time males and females spend on a first job or on their occupation in general. Only 5.2 % of women use their time for a job, as compared to 43.8% of men. The time allocated for a first job is very low for women only 0.19 hour, while for men it is 3.21 hour. Household maintenance and management takes the biggest bulk of women's time, 90.9% of women spend their time on household maintenance, as compared to 39.8% of men.

Females spend their leisure time differently than males. Males tend to spend time with their peers in public places and playing sports. While females spend more time on watching T.V., reading and participating in cultural activities. Females in Gaza, in the age group 10-24 use the computer more than males, 45.3% for females and 44.8% for males. In terms of regions, youth in the West Bank, males and females alike, use computers more than in Gaza, 58.6% in the West Bank as compared to 54.9% in Gaza (PCBS 2004). This might not be related to any lack of youth interest in using computers but could be attributed to the poor power supply in Gaza and the worse economic situation.

Youth, both males and females, complained that there is the lack of adequate institutions that provide services to suit their needs, as one mentioned:

we have few institutions even though the existing ones do not provide the suitable services for our needs, they tend to focus more on advocacy on violence and similar issues, we need institutions that help us in getting jobs or professional training that help us getting job.

The siege and Israeli movement restrictions have led to the appearance of new places for youth to spend their time in. **The rising level of unemployment among youth has been accompanied by a visible spread of cafes and water pipes shops; it has also led to an increase in the level of thefts and sexual harassments**, because as one male participant explained *youth are psychologically under pressure*. The spread of cafes and water pipes shops might be behind the high percentage of youth smoking in the Palestinian Territories. However, percentage of youth in the age group 12-24 that smoke is declining in general in 2000: it was 25.5% in 2000 and declined to 22.3% in 2004. Percentage of youth smokers in the West Bank is almost double that of Gaza, 12.2% as compared to 6.5%. This may be related to the Islamic culture more prevalent in Gaza that teaches youth not to smoke. The data also showed that smoking is largely a male practice, the percentage of smokers among males is 19.0% and for females it is only 0.08% (PCBS 2000, Data Base, Health Survey, Demographic Health Survey 2004).

Table (28): Youth Membership in Cultural Institutions: Ages 10-24 years

	Males	Females	Both Sex
West Bank			
Writing	11.1	16.2	3.6
Playing a Musical Instrument	6.0	3.4	4.7
Societies or Clubs Activities	15.8	7.4	11.6
Playing Sport	37.6	13.3	25.5
Dancing and Music at Band	6.8	9.4	8.1
Attending Symposiums and Public Lectures	13.2	14.3	13.8
<u>Singing in Bands</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>5.2</u>
Drawing	18.2	20.5	19.3
Gaza Strip			
Writing	10.5	17.9	14.3
Playing a Musical Instrument	7.7	5.4	6.6
Societies or Clubs Activities	32.0	9.2	20.4
Playing Sport	64.3	31.4	47.5
<u>Dancing and Music at Band</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.3</u>
Attending Symposiums and Public Lectures	36.4	23.5	29.9
Singing in Bands	2.6	3.2	2.9
Drawing	34.4	33.6	34.0
Palestinian Territory			
Writing	10.9	16.8	13.8
Playing a Musical Instrument	6.6	4.1	5.4
Societies or Clubs Activities	21.6	8.0	14.8
Playing Sport	47.2	20.0	33.5
Dancing and Music at Band	6.0	7.4	6.7
Attending Symposiums and Public Lectures	21.5	17.8	19.6

Singing in Bands	3.1	5.6	4.3
Drawing	24.1	25.3	24.7

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001. *Time Use Survey 1999-2000 Data Base (Unpublished Data)*.

The results based on the Time Use Survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics during May, 1999 - May, 2000 showed that 13.8% of individuals aged (10-24) years practiced writing, 5.4% playing musical instrument, 14.8% participated in societies or clubs. For activities, 33.5% played sports, 6.7% dancing with musical bands, 19.6% attended public symposiums and public lectures, 4.3% sang in bands, and 24.7% practiced drawing as amateur. While the percentages of individuals (aged 10 years and over) in the Palestinian Territory reached as follows: 9.0% practiced writing, 3.3% playing musical instrument, 11.8% participated in activities of societies or clubs, 19.3% played sports, 3.5% dancing with musical bands, 20.0% attended public symposiums and lectures, 2.3% sang in bands, and 13.5% participated drawing.

The data reveals that overall female participation in cultural and sports activities is higher in Gaza than the West Bank. This could be explained by the segregation of sports facilities for girls and also the special attention Islamist movements in Gaza pay to encourage youth to 'build their bodies and souls' away from the path of 'sin' (Jad, 2008).

The only exception to the high level of female participation in cultural activities in Gaza however, was for dancing and singing where participation was low for males and females. Dancing and music at band was higher for females in the West Bank than for males, 9.4% compared to 7.8%. While in Gaza the level of participation was 4.6% for males and 3.9% for females. Singing also revealed higher female participation than male: in the West Bank percentage was 3.3% for males and 7.0% for females, and in Gaza it was only 3.1% for males and 5.6% for females. This could be explained by the cultural views of the Islamists, who are the hegemonic power in Gaza, and regard at 'modern' dance and singing as Westernised and not 'authentic' (Jad, 2008). Thus, hegemonic cultures do affect the kind of cultural interest and orientation that youth might take.

Shifting Patterns of Participation Among Young Educated Women in Gaza

Young educated female youth in both rural and urban areas in Gaza are increasingly participating in community-based organizations as volunteers.

In contrast, uneducated young unmarried women in rural areas are the most isolated group, often confined to the home, awaiting marriage opportunities.

However the interesting phenomenon amongst young educated female youth in both rural and urban areas in Gaza is their increase inclusion in community-based organizations as volunteers. They participate in lectures and training courses and they help distribute humanitarian assistance. This is more common amongst Islamist charitable associations and not all belonging to Hamas. Educated women as well as married women with young children participate widely in the social activities of these associations with massive support from parents.

The majority sees the beneficial outputs of their daughters' participation through the obtaining of coupons or temporary jobs for three to six months, others see that their daughters are socially protected and have better opportunity to learn about life through the participation in charitable organisations, even if they do not receive immediate financial gain. These associations are not all women's organisations. The increasing role of Islamist charitable associations after Hamas took control over Gaza has reinforced women's participation in formal institutions, which women hope will increase their access to jobs – yet these new opportunities for participation are very much framed by the dominant gender norms and ascribed division of labour (Mohanna and Kleibo 2008).

The case of a 23 years old woman from Beit Hanoon illustrates the shifting patterns of participation among young educated women in Gaza. The young woman, studying information technology in university, has been forced to suspend her studies until her family has money to pay for her education. Since suspending her studies, she has become an active member in a community-based organization in Beit Hanoon. She spends around four hours a day in the association giving lessons free of charge to school students and also assisting the association staff with their computer and administrative skills. Her brother who belongs to the Islamic Jihad party prevented her at first but she insisted, arguing the work is not shameful. She works inside the institution and is not in contact with men. Her parents supported her by saying to their son:

All your life is el jihad! And the 600 NIS they give you every month are not even enough for food. Why do you want to impede her helping us? She at least brings coupons every month. Your sister doesn't do anything wrong.

He then stopped interfering and stopped restricting her mobility.

Young educated women and men are getting more involved in civil society organizations because they find it hard to find permanent jobs in the formal public sector, except through temporary job creation programs. UNRWA seems to have the widest job creation program for men and women. Some female graduates got jobs with UNRWA or government schools as teachers, but most of these jobs are on temporary basis.

In contrast, uneducated young unmarried women in rural areas are the most isolated group, often confined to the home, awaiting marriage opportunities. Included in this group, women over the age of 20 in Beit Hanoon are likely to remain *anesa* (*unmarried-spinster*): these women expressed a great deal of anxiety about their future. **Young unmarried and uneducated youth carry out most of the domestic work and childcare to allow their mothers the mobility necessary for the search of livelihood resources. None of these young women mentioned having initiated any economic activities for themselves.** Economic activity is often restricted to helping their mothers in the case of those involved in home-based agriculture or food processing activities. Single educated and uneducated unmarried young women do not participate in trading activities as it is considered *aeb* (shameful) for them to do so. Very few are pushed by their parent to attend vocational training courses with UNRWA or non-government institutions. Mothers are interested in teaching their uneducated daughters traditional skills (sewing, handicraft) that they may use in the future after marriage.

In contrast to rural peripheries such as Beit Hanoon, the situation of amongst young uneducated women in the camps and urban areas was slightly different. In the urban centres in Gaza non-educated single women have applied for temporary jobs with public or private institutions to work as cleaners or child caretakers in schools, kindergartens or nurseries. As explained in the previous sections of this study, young women have been forced to seek out such jobs in order to obtain a livelihood and often to support their family's survival; yet this, as some mothers pointed out, also reduced their opportunities for marriage.

One can conclude from the above that institutions providing services for youth can significantly affect the course of their lives and play an important role in mediating and combating the effects of Israeli military violence.

The Politics of Targeting

A sectoral approach is needed which rather than attempting to cover the needs of the 'targeted groups' through fragmented programs which are not well coordinated, integrates these groups into the process of development/and provides modes of support.

Many Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organisations follow a practice of targeting social groups. In many of their policy documents there is a clear insistence on “targeting the poor and marginalized areas” (The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth 2005; Sharek Biennial Report 2007; One Voice 2008). Yet, as with the definitional confusion surrounding the definition of the youth, the definition of who constitute the poor and the marginalised vary from one policy document to the other.³ Within these targeted groups, there are often sub-schemes targeting poor women and the destitute (the Ministry of Social Affairs for example). In addition, there are other actors, such as NGOs, political parties, religious and charitable societies, which provide vital services and aid for 'the targeted groups' they choose.

Most of the institutions that follow a policy of 'targeting' do not situate this within a comprehensive and well integrated approach on sectoral basis. **A sectoral approach is needed which, rather than attempting to cover the needs of the 'targeted groups' through fragmented programs which are not well coordinated, actually integrates these groups into the process of development and provides modes of support.** Thus, sectoral approach will focus on the youth as a group and insures that the different ministries provide well integrated services for this group. The two cases of Naeleen and the old city of Hebron shed light on the issue at hand and illustrate what we mean by a sectoral approach. First, there is a need to re-

³ In most of the government policy documents, the poor and the unemployed are the 'target groups': such as the Ministry of Labour's program to support the poor and unemployed who have large families, or the Ministry of Social Affairs that targets the poor through food distribution and financial aid programs and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education that support a lending scheme for poor students, or UNRWA programs to alleviate poverty and unemployment for the poor and the unemployed.

define who are the 'target groups' focused on in the policy documents of these institutions according to the changing political situation on the ground. As the case of the old city of Hebron showed, having a school per se might not be enough to guarantee the provision of education services for a community that is heavily targeted by public and long term violence. **The case showed that it is equally important to deal with the situation in a well coordinated, integrated manner, through a gender conscious policy that provides education, health (including psychological support), employment, security, cultural activities, poverty alleviation, capacity building and political support all together.** Hence, sectoral approach here means to put the areas, affected by a devastating, prolonged duration of Israeli military violence, as the target and work to pool resources and coordinate the efforts of the different institutions, whether governmental or non governmental, to deal with all the impacts and effects of this violence.

'Developing' Youth in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

'Developing' the youth is primarily the concern of Palestinian ministries, particularly the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Parallel quasi governmental bodies affiliated to the old structure of the PLO such as the Recruitment and National and Political Guidance Directorate also target the youth.

The Ministry of Youth and Sport's policy documents suggest that the Ministry is aware of the importance of an integrated approach to youth that incorporates them into development processes in a holistic manner.

A number of different organisations are actively involved in 'developing' the youth in the OPT. 'Development' is a term that should be used with reservations in the Palestinian context; as explained in the first section of this study, the concept of de-development (Roy, 1995) accurately captures the way that Israel controls all aspects of Palestinian life and economy and works to prevent and destroy possible foundations for tangible development.

'Developing' the youth is primarily the concern of many Palestinian ministries such as the Ministry of Labour, Education, Social Affairs, Women's Affairs, Health, Culture and Information and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. It is important to point out that **there are also parallel quasi governmental bodies affiliated to the old structure of the PLO such as the Recruitment and National and Political Guidance Directorate which also target the youth.** Adding to this governmental body, many NGOs, charitable societies, sports clubs, unions and political organizations and parties also focus on the youth.

The institutional practices of these organisations is set against an overall context in which youth participation in public life in the West Bank and Gaza has been declining since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo Agreement of 1993. During the Oslo years, the focus of the PA shifted from mobilising and organising the people to resist the Occupation into an era of establishing control and authority – in short 'state building'. The merging of the new PA structure with the old PLO structure proved to be a de-mobilising process that affected all youth and women's organizations as well as activism as a whole in the OPT (Jad, 2008). The following

example delineates and reveals the impact that this merge had on the development vision of the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS) and its approach to gender mainstreaming.

The Ministry of Youth and Sport's philosophy for a national social agenda for children and teenagers focuses on civic culture, promoting basic rights such as freedom of expression, gender equality, democracy and participation. However, as indicated, the ministry is also shadowed by another structure linked directly to the President's office and the remnants of the PLO: the *Recruitment and National and Political Guidance Directorate* which follows a nationalistic agenda for youth focused on 'symbolic' military training and political indoctrination in favour of the ruling party and the political leadership. The Ministry and the Directorate represent two different policies with two distinct sets of gender sub-texts. **In the Ministry of Youth and Sports, gender issues are integrated more systematically through regulations and programmes: equal participation for both sexes in the camps, highlighting gender equality through activities, and by making more efforts at the community level to encourage parents to send their daughters to co-educational camps.** The Ministry of Youth and Sport's gender mainstream agenda is important, however, it implements the 'mainstreaming' agenda as if independence had been achieved, and as though new governance structures could take the gender agenda into account.

In the case of the Directorate, gender issues were targeted by including both sexes in the 'national agenda' i.e. in the military training camps. Gender issues were not dealt with as a social problem even in the workshops designed for female cadres, but rather as in the old PLO formula, that men and women should both participate in liberating Palestine. Thus, no special efforts are done to remove obstacles that might hinder female participation, especially in rural and remote areas. The differences between the Ministry and the Directorate highlight the confusion between the national and social agendas. **They also point to the fact that some governmental bodies are more gender-aware than others.** In an attempt to contest the parallel authority of the Directorate, the first Ministry of Youth and Sports depicted the Directorate as being gender blind which is an example of the internal conflicts in the PA. After few months, the 'gender-aware' Minister of Youth and Sports was demoted because of his critical stands on patronage and corruption in the PA. He was replaced by a 'religious' figure in order to accommodate the Islamists. With the split in the government bodies after the legislative elections of 2006 that brought the Islamic Movement of Hamas to power, the Islamist minister was removed to be replaced by a member of the ruling party of Fateh. In Gaza, all ministries are controlled by Islamists figures.

The importance of the Ministry of Youth and Sports stems from its mission, it is the sole ministry targeting youth and adolescence, and also from its wide reach on the national level: the Ministry has established many directorates that cover all areas under the PA control. However, the Ministry's work is also undercut by different factors; the many governmental shuffles disturb a sound and sustainable planning for youth development and support. This situation is aggravated by a meagre budget allocated to the Ministry of Youth and Sport which do exceed 0.05% (The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth, 2005).

The Ministry of Youth and Sports approach to the youth is illustrated in its policy documents. The Ministry has produced two important policy documents: “The Developmental Plan for the Ministry of Youth and Sports” in 2004 and “The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth” in 2005/2006. Both documents were built on participatory methods that involved youth, educators, activists and experts from different fields. Both included diversified programs aimed at integrating youth in the development process and not target them as a separate group (The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth, 2005). The Policy Plan suggests working on different fields affecting the well being of youth, such as health and environment, including psychological health, poverty, work and unemployment, family relations, culture art and information and finally recreation and time use. **The suggested plans are aware of the importance of an integrated approach to youth development and support and include programs targeting a wide range of sub-groups: the field of education for example, the targeted include, those who dropped out of schools, those who have special needs, the poor male and female students, as well as creative students and also the slow learner. However, the documents are not aware of the special needs of the areas under long durations of public violence or affected by the Wall and the checkpoints. There is a reference to these areas but with no specific planning or targeting.**

‘Developing’ Youth in the Current Crisis

The overall decline in the Palestinian national budget is likewise reflected in a decline in the budget allocated to youth development.

The move to humanitarian emergency aid may further compromise the consolidation of integrated and sustained development plans for the youth, as this undermines funding of the PA and its national development programs.

After 2006 legislative elections and the Israeli sanctions and siege imposed on all Palestinian territories, government, donors and NGOs all went back again to the emergency intervention at the expense of a 'development' approach. In 2005, donors contributed approximately \$1.3 billion, which was equal to 22% of GDI in the OPT. This funding was divided between budget support (27%), humanitarian aid (38%) and development aid (35%). However, it was also divided between different funding channels. Of the 2004 committed funds, 33% was channelled through UN agencies (of which 98% was support for UNRWA), 4% was channelled through NGOs, and 48% was channelled through the PNA (of which 65% was classified as budget support) (The World Bank, 2006).

In this context, the programs and initiatives for the youth are severely constrained by the overall contraction of the PA budget. The bulk of the Palestinian income largely goes to cover salaries for the PNA employees which it does not leave room to fund development policies. The PNA currently employs about 152,000 people (11,000 in the health sector, 39,000 in the education sector and 73,000 in the security sector. The remaining 29,000 employees are divided among other ministries such as the Ministry of Planning, Local Government, National Economy etc) (UN Office, 2006). **The overall decline in the Palestinian national budget is likewise**

reflected in a decline in the budgets allocated to youth development, as the table below shows.

Table (29): **Budget allocated to governmental institutions for youth in the field of culture and information**

Ministry of youth and sports	2003	2004	2005
Palestine T.V and Broadcast	%0.45	%040	%0.33
Wafa News Agency	%0.69	%062	%0.46
The National Committee for Science, Culture and Education	%0.13	%0.12	%0.10
Ministry of Culture	%0.2	%0.2	%0.2
Public Information Centre	%0.20	%0.18	%0.14
Palestine Satellite TV	%0.8	%0.7	%0.6
	%0.00	%0.00	%0.8

Source: Ministry of Finance, Public Relations Department, PA General Budget for the years 2003-2005.

The table reveals a steady decline in the percentage of the government budget allocated towards youth culture development (The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth, 2005). The total funds allocated to the above mentioned institutions dropped from 2.23% of the total national budget in the year 2003, to reach 2% in 2004 and 1.68% in 2005.

The decline in the budget allocated to youth was reflected in the recent Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) of 2008-2010. The plan put a strong emphasis on 'law and order' especially in the West Bank. This stress on security measures reflected itself in the distribution of the budget. 230 million dollars were allocated to " Security Sector Reform & Transformation (SSRT)" representing 14% of a total budget of 1.644 \$m, while 20 \$m representing 1.2% of the total budget was allocated to "youth empowerment" (PRDP 2007).

The move to humanitarian emergency aid may further compromise the consolidation of integrated and sustained development plans for the youth, as this undermines funding of the PA and its national development programs. As the World Bank warns, a policy of non-support for development aid is inherently tied to a decision to undermine the PNA. This is because, in comparison to development aid, a considerably larger percentage of humanitarian aid does not go through the PNA. Rather, humanitarian aid tends to go to local and international non-governmental organisations. Yet, in any country, the government is the bastion of development. Governments have the responsibility for ensuring that the enabling factors for development are in place – from providing for rule of law to establishing sound economic policies and supplying essential services. Thus, cutting support for development is directly connecting with cutting support for governmental institutions (MOP, 2006).

At the same time, in the Palestinian context the formula which maintains that investing in the government is a better guarantee for investing in development processes as a whole, does not fully capture the whole Palestinian context in which the PA is in place primarily to insure the

Israeli security and to control its population, which is why there is such a heavy investment in security forces as shown above. **In addition, given the current split between the West Bank and Gaza after the Hamas take over of all government institutions in Gaza in June 2007, the call to invest in the government effectively means investing in only part of the government, serving only one part of the Palestinian people.**

'Developing' Youth: The Role of NGOs

Does this mean that a better strategy would be to support NGOs and civil society organisations to 'develop' youth? The answer is not straightforward as the political split has affected also all activism and services provided by civil society organizations, those who are active in Gaza are targeted by the Hamas government and those active in the West Bank are targeted and harassed by the West Bank government. However, some NGOs are involved in many important development policies and programs that target youth. Sharek is one of these leading NGOs in the field of youth development. The organization follows a vision aiming at

"the empowerment of youth through the strengthening of their personal and practical skills and their participation in civil society that will provide a vital platform for the development of Palestinian society" (Sharek, Biennial Report 2006/2007: 4).

Sharek follows an individual empowerment approach (Kabeer, 1999) to youth development through the provision of training, counselling in job training, rights education and small business incubators for new graduates. This is implemented through various projects that aim to build the capacity and capabilities of young people, thus facilitating their entry into the labor market. In its efforts, the organization is fully aware of gender issues and takes this into account in all of its projects. An example of Sharek's approach to the youth is the projects "Step Forward". Through this project the organisation provided paid training to around 3000 youth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in private sector companies and non-governmental organizations for a period of between 3 to 6 months. Within the project results, 2206 youth had signed contracts with 850 host organizations. 57% of these contracts were signed by female youth, 40% by males and 3% by youth with special needs. Half of the contracted youth possessed a BA degree, 20% a diploma, 12% a vocational school certificate and 18% had completed high school. Moreover, 58% of the participating youth were from urban areas, 34% from rural areas and 8% from refugee camps. At the end of the year, the number of contracts had reached 2343 in the West Bank and 451 in the Gaza Strip (Sharek, Biennial Report 2006/2007:10).

Sharek's work tends to reinforce the regional disparities, assisting urban areas over underserved rural and refugee camps, and favouring the West Bank over Gaza - when the level of unemployment in Gaza are clearer much higher than in the West Bank. The statistical data reveals these gaps and points to the existence of disparities which favour urban areas over rural and refugee camps – see the annex (2) for breakdown of youth drop out rates by region. The fulfilment of the specific needs of areas affected by long duration public violence was also not among the objectives of the organisation. While some efforts were put to enhance the collective power of youth through the encouragement of voluntarism, networking and coordination between

youth organizations, however, no attention was given to build the collective power of a youth movement, whether among students, workers, unemployed or the marginalized groups. The great success that Sharek achieved in two years, however, shows that youth are in dire need for institutional services and support.

The Different Impacts of Youth Participation in Community-Based Institutions

Youth, especially females, from rural and urban areas, which are far from the urban centres are more marginalised in terms of access as most facilities are in the city centres and in the camps. Within this category uneducated women are the most disadvantaged.

With regard to the services these institutions provide, it is clear that as the number of graduates increases what the institutions offer is not sufficient for the youth's wider needs and priorities, particularly building a career.

As outlined above, a large number of males and females are involved in community youth based associations, largely in the form of temporary job schemes. Many of the youth expressed satisfaction with these institutions and the youth programs, through which they gained lots of experience and developed professional skills. Nonetheless, a significant number of youth, especially men, criticised youth programs, in particular, as they do not provide job opportunities to those who are most in need, and they give preference to those who have long experience of volunteering, particularly for women. Youth who have been involved in these institutions for a long time have repeatedly benefited from the youth programs often more than newly involved youth. This made some home youth, especially men less interested in volunteering and they have retreated to home-based activities, spending most of their times playing cards and watching TV (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

In terms of mobility and access to these institutions, youth, especially females, from rural and urban areas which are far from the urban centres are more marginalised as most facilities are in the city centres and in the camps. Moreover, following the rapid deterioration after the siege on Gaza and the spread of the transport crisis, many young men and women have stopped or reduced their participation in youth activities. Male and female youth in border areas in Gaza or besieged areas in the West Bank are less able to move and participate in these organisations than those living in the cities centres because of their feelings of insecurity related to the Israeli incursions and bombings. **Since the closure of Gaza, youth mobility has decreased against an increase of mobility amongst middle aged and older women; the same trend was also described by women and young females in Hebron and other targeted areas.**

Very few of the *young uneducated women aged 17-22* in Gaza mentioned participating in the neighbourhood's community organisations. **This group of girls aged 17 to 22, unmarried and uneducated are considered the most disadvantaged as they do not participate in any form of public activities**, except few who live nearby the associations, and they are usually accompanied by their mothers in case of participation. Another reason, as mothers explained, is that women at this age are less confident to move alone and are not able to face any abuse they may encounter, not like a university students. Other group of mothers accompanied their young

uneducated girls to institutions hoping mothers who look for brides for their sons may see them. This was not accepted in the past, but now it has become encouraged for the sake of securing the social security of daughters. Mothers in the West Bank similarly fear harassments against their daughter by the Israelis soldiers on checkpoints.

With regard to the services these institutions provide to the youth, it is clear that as the number of graduates increases what these institutions offer is not sufficient for the youth's wider needs and priorities. Although youth asserted that temporary jobs for graduates are very useful, these opportunities are restricted to temporary income generation rather than building up sustainable career (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

The staff of youth associations participating in a focus group in Gaza mentioned that youth interest in capacity-building activities has rapidly decreased in the last year because of the difficulties of transport and the decline of paid employment. Youth participation in youth associations becomes meaningless without financial return, especially as youth have to cover their own daily expenses, for instance, such as travel expense. Most female university graduates from Gaza city and from the camps with better access to youth activities pointed out that they have recently decreased their involvement due to frustration over the lack of jobs. Some parents have stopped their daughters from visiting institutions every day because they failed to find a job. Young men and women equally rejected thinking about starting their own businesses because of the instability of Gaza's market. They also did not show interest in micro-credit, but they prefer regular jobs regardless of income level (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

One young educated woman aspiring and talented said:

There are many projects supporting youth to start their own business. But I think these projects meaningfully ignore the reality in Gaza. I believe that they are a waste of money. I know some friends who got a soft loan to make an Internet cafe in Rafah and after a few months they closed down because of the competition. What sort of business can we graduated men and women do while the existing businesses are bankrupted? I have studied IT and I consider myself very professional. My parents won't allow me to open up an Internet cafe by myself. We as young graduates can't go and set up a basta in front of our homes or start other businesses related to our specialisation because professionals dominate them. Our best option is to find a regular job in the public institutions (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

Youth interested in mobilisation and awareness-raising in the local community has also decreased with the increased interference of Hamas' apparatus in the work of secular youth institutions. Some female youth are reluctant to frequently visit secular youth institutions, especially out of the cities, because they are scared this may damage their reputation. Hamas has launched a number of attacks against gender mixed institutions in different areas of the Gaza Strip, which has increased young women's insecurity about participating in these organisations (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

Youth Immigration: Males leave Females Stay

In the West Bank focus groups, single educated males were the most willing to leave and married males were less interested in leaving. Finding a job was the main reason why males wanted to leave.

In Gaza, educated males from better off families were more interested in migration than uneducated poor. Males who how are inclined to migrate are more socially isolated than others. Family responsibility is the main restriction amongst male youth who do not think about migration.

”If I were a man I would think of leaving the country a long time ago, here we have no jobs” said one of the female interviewees in Naeleen village. In the West Bank focus groups, single educated males were the most willing to leave and married males were less interested in leaving. As one married participant stated *“I am married with children, maybe those who cannot afford forming a family are the most willing to leave.”* **Finding a job was the main reason why males wanted to leave; even those who already have a job expressed dissatisfaction with their working condition and hoped for a form of decent employment.** Some males for instance mentioned their experience working with the Palestinian security apparatuses:

I work now with the Presidential Guard but I want to leave, the salary (1500 NIS) is low, that this is if we get it at all, we work long hours and if I arrive late to work they shave my head or they put me in a solitary confinement or I have to crow naked on broken glass.

Another man was working for another security apparatus and resigned:

I spent most of my time in the prison instead of working, it was such a relief when I left.

Most of the participants in the focus groups in the West Bank put the blame on the Palestinian Authority, which failed to provide them with jobs, or as they stated the PA offers limited opportunities opened to:

Those who don't deserve it, I finished my BA in finance and accounting and I was rejected a job in the government but there are some who work with them without even their high school certificate (tawjehee).

Female participants showed less interest in migration, many of them were finding difficulty in leaving their own house, especially by night, for fear of the army and settlers, and others can hardly leave their villages. **However, leaving for education or work was commonly accepted by most with the exception of those living in isolated areas without public support.**

In Gaza, the wish to leave was predominant too. In the absence of opportunities, migration has become the personal goal for many male youth (educated and uneducated, married and unmarried). This is more common amongst youth who belong to Fatah. They don't feel secure about their life while they all lost power they gained by their own or their families' loyalty to Fatah. **Educated males from better off families were more interested in migration than uneducated poor.** Male with family responsibility do not think about migration. The main motive for migration is not only to search for a career, but more importantly for security and to

have freedom of mobility and expression. They do not think that Hamas can afford it for people who have a different ideology or political loyalty.. **Males who are inclined to migrate are more socially isolated than others. Family responsibility is the main restriction amongst male youth who do not think about migration, as it is shameful for a man to leave his family in a vulnerable situation.**

The idea of migration for female youth in Gaza is directly dependent on the wishes of family or husbands. University students and graduates showed some interest in migration, but they know in advance that they cannot take this decision by themselves. The only way for young women to migrate is either to be accompanied by their parents or their husbands (Mohanna and Kleibo, 2008).

Statistical data confirmed this common wish among the youth. 24% of adolescents and youth showed their wish to leave, 29% for males and 20% for females. The reasons given were: looking for job (36%), lack of political stability (32%), education (17%), get rid of family problems (7%) and other reasons (8%) (The National Policy for Adolescents and Youth, 2005: 47). Many of Palestine's young and upcoming professionals are leaving in droves for the brighter, more stable banks of Europe, America and for those who remain hopeful that one day they might return, neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Palestinian foreign office estimates nearly 10,000 applications for immigration are received and accepted by countries across the globe from the Palestinian populace every 4 months. Many of these 'greener pastures' add to an already growing problem by giving incentives – be it financial or otherwise – to those emigrants that are highly skilled, as in the future they are likely to invest back into the host country (Palestine Monitor, 2008).

The Israeli Authority exerts control over Palestinian emigration, immigration, and repatriation. In most case an unfair balance is struck between the three. According to the Palestinian Authorities' foreign office, Israel was sitting on over 120,000 applications for short and long term residencies as of 2006. Much to the delight of Israel, this policy is resulting in a disproportionate number of Palestinians leaving, as those entering the country (Palestine Monitor, 2008).

Conclusions

In conclusion, the analysis above has suggested the importance of aggregating data by targeted/non targeted areas. The actual aggregation by West Bank and Gaza and sub-aggregation by area is not enough to capture the specific situation and conditions in which the most areas targeted by the Israeli hostile policies live in. Moreover, we have suggested that the long duration violence of Israel violence can lead to the internal disintegration of the targeted community and internalisation of violence inflicted on them.

In two very different instances of localities targeted by a persistent scale of public violence, the qualitative data and fieldwork revealed the importance of supportive institutions, whether governmental or not governmental, in helping the targeted community to cope, establish a measure of well being and combat the effects of Israeli violence. The lack of such institutions can

indirectly help in facilitating the Israeli goals of disintegrating these communities and urging its inhabitants to leave their homes and land.

Gender aware development youth institutions can play a vital role in creating new opportunities for young women and new graduates. When such opportunities are available and are rewarding, cultural constraints are not a hindrance on more women's activism and participation.

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Knowledge Translation: A Research Matters Toolkit: Bridging the “Know-do” gap. A resource for researchers.

[12266886561Research Matters - Knowledge Translation Toolkit .pdf](#)

ILO Arab States Gender Equality Newsletter 3 July 2010

[ILO Arab States Gender Equality Newsletter 3 July 2010.pdf](#)

IDRC book Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research by Fred Carden.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10625/37706>

Title: Knowledge to policy : making the most of development research

Authors: [Carden, Fred](#)

Keywords: DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
RESEARCH PROJECTS
IDRC
POLICY MAKING
DECISION MAKING
GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC POLICY

Issue Date: 2009

Publisher: IDRC, Ottawa, ON, CA

Abstract: Does research influence public policy and decision-making and, if so, how? This book is the most recent to address this question, investigating the effects of research in the field of international development. It starts from a sophisticated understanding about how research influences public policy and decision-making. It shows how research can contribute to better governance in at least three ways: by encouraging open inquiry and debate, by empowering people with the knowledge to hold governments accountable, and by enlarging the array of policy options and solutions available to the policy process. // Knowledge to Policy examines the consequences of 23 research projects funded by Canada's International Development Research Centre. Key findings and case studies from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are presented in a reader-friendly, journalistic style, giving the reader a deeper grasp and understanding of approaches, contexts, relationships, and events. // The book will be useful to academics, researchers, and students of political science, public administration, development studies, and international affairs; professionals in donor and development organizations worldwide; policy- and decision-makers in government and international arenas; and development agencies and civil society organizations concerned with integrating the voice of citizens into policy- and decision-making processes.

Description: Co-published with SAGE Publications

Library has French version: Des connaissances aux politiques : tirer le meilleur parti possible de la recherche en développement

Library has Spanish version: Del conocimiento a la política : máximo aprovechamiento de la investigación para el desarrollo

URI: <http://hdl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/handle/123456789/37706>

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987-1-55250-417-8

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Reading Material

- 1- Approaches to Measuring Capacity and Capacity Building for Policy - Research

Ladi, Stella and Pop, Daniel (July 2004)

Web reference:

<http://cps.ceu.hu/download.php?oid=T21368348681284c9d3636e2248ea3c9;aid=T8186e3285822842933e4c695ece5d2b;file=;download;>

- 2- Security, Peace and Governance in Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Research Arenas, Practices and Capacities

Mihyo, Prof. Paschal B. Conference Knowledge on the Move (February 2008)

Web reference: <http://www.nuffic.nl/home/news-events/past-events/knowledge-on-the-move/abstracts-papers-keynotes>

- 3- In Search of Strategy: An Agenda for Applied Research on Transitions from Conflict

Taylor, Mark B. and Kathleen M. Jennings (2004)

Web reference: <http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/480/480.pdf>

- 4- Bridging Research and Policy in International Development: An Analytical and Practical Framework

John Young and Julius Court in Development in Practice, Volume 16, Number 1, February 2006.

Web Reference: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/168.pdf>

- 5- Bridging Research and Policy in International Development: Context, Evidence and Links' in 'Global Knowledge Networks and International Development Julius Court and John Young Book Chapter (October 2004)

Web Reference: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=169&title=bridging-research-policy-international-development- context-evidence-links>

- 6- Tools for Policy Impact: A Handbook for Researchers Daniel Start and Ingie Hovland (2004)

Web Reference: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/156.pdf>

- 7- Research and Policy in Development: Does Evidence Matter? An ODI Meeting Series (September 2004)

Web Reference: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/163.pdf>

8- How the Sphere Project Came into Being: A Case Study of Policy-making in the Humanitarian Aid Sector and the Relative Influence

Margie Buchanan-Smith (July 2003)

Web Reference: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/146.pdf>

Information about Accommodation

Remember that the price includes linen, towels and kitchen ware, the needed for preparing breakfast. The kitchen has fridge, and microwaves. All the energetic expenses are included in the price.

About the location, Vila Universitaria is placed in Cerdanyola del Vallès, only 20 kilometres far away from the city of Barcelona . The communication between the Campus and the Catalonian capital is fast and fluid, thanks to the public transport and motorways network.

By train: In Plaza Catalunya, the main centre of Barcelona , you should take the train of "Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya" (FGC), that runs with a frequency of 15 minutes. Take the S55 and S2 lines, to Bellaterra Station. Once you are at the station, you should take the way directed to "Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona". From Barcelona to Vila Universitaria , the train takes 30 minutes.

By air: In the airport, you should get a train (RENFE), to Sants Station. There you should take the underground (green line) or a train to Plaza Catalunya (where you can get the FGC).

By bus: The N62 night bus runs between Plaza Catalunya and Vila Universitaria during all night.

For further information contact the following links:

<http://www.fgc.net/accesible/eng/viatjar/xarxa.htm>

<http://www.fgc.net/accesible/eng/viatjar/horaris.php>

http://www.renfe.es/cercanias/barcelona/index_horarios.html

http://www.renfe.es/cercanias/barcelona/mapa_zonas.html

In order to keep the apartment keys, you must come to the Vila Universitaria reception. If you have any doubt or you need further information, I will be pleased in attending you.

Route to UAB Campus

How to get to the Campus?

The Campus is integrated in the public transportation system of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. The motorways AP-7 and C-58 also guarantee good private transportation routes from Barcelona and the main Catalan capitals.

From the airport: There is no public transportation that connects directly with the UAB Campus.

By [taxi](#): taxis are black and yellow-colored and can be ordered by phone, picked up at authorized taxi stands or flagged down in the streets. Always check that the meter is running. Taxis should usually be paid in cash though some accept credit cards. The cost from the airport to the UAB Campus is around 50,00/60,00 €.

By [bus](#): You have to take the aerobus in front of your arrival terminal until Catalunya Square (Barcelona), the length of the trip is approximately 30 minutes, and runs from 06.00 am till 00:30 am. The cost of a one-way ticket is about 4,50 €, and about 7,50 € for a round-trip one. Tickets can be bought on the bus.

From Barcelona to the UAB Campus:

- **By [train](#):** once you are in Catalunya square (Plaça Catalunya) take the FGC train (Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya) direction Sabadell (S2) or direction UAB (S55) and stop at the Universitat Autònoma station. The length of the trip is about 30 minutes. The cost of a one-way trip is 2.05 €. You can also buy a ten-way-trip ticket for 15.40 €. If you are staying at the AUB Campus, please stop at the Bellaterra station.

- **By [taxi](#):** taxis in Barcelona are black and yellow-colored, can be ordered by phone, picked up at authorized taxi stands or flagged down in the streets. Always check that the meter is running. Taxis should usually be paid in cash though some accept credit cards. The cost of a taxi from Barcelona to the UAB Campus is approximately 40 €.

How to move inside the UAB Campus: A free bus service communicates with the different buildings within the campus.

I am also sending you the exact address of the “Vila Universitaria” housing facility on the UAB campus, in case you need it in the course of making your transportation plans to and from the Barcelona airport.

Vila Universitària (University apartments):

Vila Universitària, Campus UAB - 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès

Tel. +34.935 803 095

Fax. + 34.935 809 186

Contact person: Inés Zamora – e-mail: ines.zamora@uab.cat
Phone number: +34 935 817 004

Detailed Maps

1- Link to Directions to Campus



2- Map of Route to Campus & Map of Campus:

http://wocmes.iemed.org/uploads/20090519/MAPA_E_CAP_INGLES.pdf

3- Detailed Map of Campus Area where Housing and Conference Facilities for WOCMES will be:

http://wocmes.iemed.org/uploads/20090805/Plano_Filosofia_WOCMES_UAB.0.pdf

Reimbursements and Receipt Form

AFWG Policy Workshop Barcelona, Spain

July, 2010

ALL original receipts MUST be included for reimbursements.

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Full Address: _____

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University Affiliation: _____

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****Please provide: Full coordinates for where your reimbursement should be sent.****

Purpose of Meeting: AFWG Policy Workshop

Dates of Meeting: July, 2010

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**AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT
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<input type="checkbox"/> MEAL TOTAL	\$ _____
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P.I. Signature _____ Date _____

Grant: **IDRC: AFWG**

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